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I. Introduction
In January of 1944, President Franklin D. Roosevelt delivered
his annual State of the Union Address during one of his famous
Fireside Chats from the White House. 1 In the face of the horrors of
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee School of Law, 2018;
Bachelor of Arts, cum laude, Political Science and Religious Studies, Gettysburg
College, 2013.
1. See 1944 State of the Union Address: FDR’s Second Bill of
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World War II, with its crimes against humanity and egregious loss
of life from battle and other means, 2 Roosevelt stressed the
importance of inalienable rights, entrenched in the American
Constitution and found deep within the consciousness of American
citizens. 3 In the speech, Roosevelt stressed the importance of a
greater, more American “standard of living . . . higher than ever
before known.” 4 This State of the Union Address became better
known as the “Second” or “Economic Bill of Rights.” 5 Roosevelt
called for “new goals of human happiness and well-being”
explaining:
As our nation has grown in size and stature . . . . We have
come to a clear realization of the fact that true individual
freedom cannot exist without economic security and
independence . . . . We have accepted, so to speak, a
second Bill of Rights under which a new basis of security
and prosperity can be established for all—regardless of
station, race or creed. The right to a useful and
Rights or Economic Bill of Rights Speech, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT PRESIDENTIAL
LIBR. & MUSEUM, http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/archives/stateoftheunion.
html (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) (“On January 11, 1944, President Franklin D.
Roosevelt delivered his annual State of the Union Address to the Nation as a
Fireside Chat from the White House.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
2. See President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Message to
Congress, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Jan. 11, 1944), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16518 (“This Nation in the past two years has become an active
partner in the world’s greatest war against human slavery. We have joined with
like-minded people in order to defend ourselves in a world that has been gravely
threatened by gangster rule.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil
Rights & Social Justice).
3. See id. (“But I do not think that any of us Americans can be content with
mere survival. Sacrifices that we and our allies are making impose upon us all a
sacred obligation to see to it that out of this war we and our children will gain
something better than mere survival.”).
4. See id. (discussing the importance of human rights, including those of
the economic variety: “We cannot be content, no matter how high the general
standard of living may be, if some fraction of our people —whether it be one-third
or one-fifth or one-tenth- is ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill housed, and insecure”).
5. See John Nichols, Seventy Years on, Let us Renew FDR’s Struggle for an
Economic Bill of Rights, NATION (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.thenation.com/
article/seventy-years-let-us-renew-fdrs-struggle-economic-bill-rights/ (explaining
the significance of the New Deal to “challenge economic royalists on behalf of the
great mass of Americans, and to establish that wider freedom” and expressing
concern that this goal has not yet been achieved) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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remunerative job in the industries or shops or farms or
mines of the Nation; The right to earn enough to provide
adequate food and clothing and recreation; . . . . The right
of every businessman, large and small, to trade in an
atmosphere of freedom from unfair competition and
domination by monopolies at home or abroad; . . . . The
right to adequate medical care and the opportunity to
achieve and enjoy good health; The right to adequate
protection from the economic fears of old age, sickness,
accident, and employment. 6
Decades after this State of the Union and the death of Roosevelt,
American institutions continue to experiment with how best to
implement these “new goals of human happiness and well-being.” 7
Modern economic regulation has had a profound effect on
Constitutional democracy, federalism and individual rights,
transformed during the “rights revolution” of the 1960s and
1970s. 8 The rights revolution includes the creation of a set of
fundamental legal rights afforded to all Americans, not explicitly
mentioned in the framing of the American Constitution, but
guaranteed through recognition of a variety of basic human
rights. 9 These rights included “rights to clean air and water; safe
consumer products and workplaces; a social safety net including
adequate food, medical care and shelter; and freedom from public
and private discrimination on the basis of race, sex disability, and
age.” 10 This revolution is suggested to have been “presaged” by
Roosevelt’s call for this Second Bill of Rights, culminating in

6. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, supra note 2.
7. Id.; see also Nichols, supra note 5 (describing Roosevelt’s legacy and his
opinion that these goals have yet to be realized in the modern world).
8. See CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE
REGULATORY STATE 1 (1990) (“Modern regulation has profoundly affected
constitutional democracy, by renovating the original commitments to checks and
balances, federalism, and individual rights. The nature and scope of this
transformation, which culminated in the rights revolution of the 1960s and 1970s,
have not generally been appreciated.”).
9. See id. at 1–10 (introducing the “rights revolution” as the promotion of
rights unknown to the founding generation, including a healthful environment,
safe products, and freedom from discrimination).
10. See id. at v (listing the catalogue of legal rights established by the
President and Congress that, while deviating from the original text of the
Constitution, nonetheless have been protected by regulation and statute).

264

24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 261 (2017)

passage of an abundance of statutory rights in the 1960s and
1970s. 11
Roosevelt concluded in his 1944 State of the Union with a call
for Congress to “explore the means for implementing this economic
bill of rights—for it is definitely the responsibility of the Congress
to do so.” 12 Notably, no Congress expressly adopted these rights,
but a wide array of federal programs and statues have drastically
altered the structure of the American political system and achieved
important successes in the Nation’s framework. 13 Scholars have
noted that in certain aspects, this “rights revolution” has failed to
serve the public interest, responding instead to powerful and selfinterested private groups. 14 This rights revolution has failed in the
face of imperfect economic rights and oppressive occupational
regimes. 15
The Alternatives to Licensing that Lower Obstacles to Work
Act (ALLOW Act) 16 presents a potential solution and a response to
Roosevelt’s seventy-two-year-old call to Congress to promote
economic liberty. Occupational licensing is exclusively a state and
local function, and has not yet been considered at the federal level
until this juncture in United States’ policy. 17 The ALLOW Act aims
11. See id. (explaining the renaissance of the “rights revolution,” its
outcomes, and the progress that has yet to be achieved).
12. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, supra note 2.
13. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 8, at 18–21 (discussing New Deal
Constitutionalism and the beginning of regulatory practices that originated
during this period).
14. See id. at v (articulating the shortcomings of regulatory programs and
explaining pitfalls that jeopardize important values, produce inefficiencies,
uphold the power of self-interested private organizations and potential
“nullification” of beneficial programs by the marketplace).
15. See Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, Can Labor Regulation Hinder
Economic Performance? Evidence from India, 119 Q.J. ECON. 91, 93 (2004)
(asserting that countries with higher regulation of occupational entry perform
worst in “an array” of economic indicators, including social, political, and
economic).
16. See Alternatives to Licensing that Lower Obstacles to Work Act of 2016,
S. 3158, 114th Cong. (2016) [hereinafter ALLOW Act] (reducing the
anticompetitive impact of licensing requirements by making targeted changes to
licensure policies).
17. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL, LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ISSUES IN PRICE MAINTENANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 33 (1975)
[hereinafter NAAG] (outlining the occupational licensing framework, or lack
thereof, in the federal government).
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to create federal licensure policy, restrict the power of licensing
regimes implemented at the state level and through the blessing
of state government, relieve the burden of taxing requirements
throughout the states and eliminate exclusionary practices of
various state licensing boards. 18
The ALLOW Act, if passed, has the potential to relieve
occupational licensing burdens for military families and residents
in affected industries in the District of Columbia. 19 By
harmonizing
occupational
entry
requirements
through
endorsement of licensing and public certifications issued in any
state, the act would promote more opportunities for military
families, disproportionately affected by state licensing laws. 20 The
Act aims to serve as a model for occupational licensing reforms in
the states by making the District of Columbia its example. It is
focused on promoting less restrictive requirements and more
legislative oversight of licensing boards, many of which have
become corrupt and unduly restrictive of entry. 21 Accordingly, this
Note discusses the Constitutionality of the ALLOW Act and argues
it is Constitutionally defendable, applicable, and necessary to
adjust the framework of occupational licensing regimes in the
United States, when analyzed on the Commerce Clause, Army
18. See Press Release, Office of Congressman Mark Meadows, Rep. Meadows
Introduces ALLOW Act (Nov. 15, 2016), https://meadows.house.gov/mediacenter/press-releases/rep-meadows-introduces-the-allow-act
[hereinafter
Meadows Press Release] (explaining the desired outcome of implementing the
ALLOW Act) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); see also BENJAMIN SHIMBERG, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A PUBLIC
PERSPECTIVE 8 (1982) (describing previous Congressional attempts to eliminate
occupational licensing regimes with exclusionary practices that impact job
opportunities of individuals seeking professional licensing).
19. See generally ALLOW Act, supra note 16 (discussing the possible impact
the ALLOW Act can have on occupational licensing burdens).
20. See ALLOW Act Summary, MIKE LEE U.S. SEN. UTAH,
https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/alternatives-to-licensing-that-lowerobstacles-to-wrok-allow-act (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) [hereinafter ALLOW Act
Summary] (describing the desired outcome of the senate bill as reducing “the
anticompetitive impact of unjustifiable licensing requirements by making
targeted changes to licensure policies”) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see generally ALLOW Act, supra note 16
(same).
21. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (explaining the benefits of the
ALLOW Act for military families, individuals in the District of Columbia, and
those on Federal lands).
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Clause, Supremacy Clause, and the Federal Enclave Clause. This
Note also suggests that the ALLOW Act should, go further to
protect the ability of rightfully qualified citizens to work in their
trained occupations across the United States.
This Note explores the remedies provided by the ALLOW Act
to curtail restrictive occupational licensing methods that
negatively impact low to moderate income families as well as
military families and personnel. Section II will define occupational
licensing, explore the origins and criticisms of the regulatory
practice, summarize the effects and benefits, and finally will
outline the practical failures of occupational licensing in modern
America. Section III outlines the ALLOW Act, its targeted
beneficiaries, and the remedies the Act proposes. Section IV will
review the constitutionality of the Act as it stands today. Section
V analyzes the limits of any possible expansions of the Act,
considering the constitutional limitations under the Tenth
Amendment. Finally, section VI concludes this examination with a
call to Congress pass the ALLOW Act to protect the professional
freedom of thousands of American citizens.
II. Occupational Regulation: Classification, History, Benefits, and
Repercussions
Many professionals are licensed by the state, and while some
of the professions that require state licenses include professions
that one would assume, e.g., doctors, lawyers, architects, and
nurses, and licensing administrations typically cover many more
professions. 22 Additional professions include a wide variety and
22. See Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should
Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1093, 1103
(2014) (“Where licensing was once reserved for lawyers, doctors, and other
“learned professionals,” now floral designers, fortune tellers, and taxidermists are
among the jobs that , at least in some states, require licensing.”); see also MORRIS
M. KLEINER, THE HAMILTON PROJECT, REFORMING OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
POLICIES 21 (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/
THP_KleinerDiscPaper_final.pdf [hereinafter HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER]
(“[S]ome occupations would benefit from lesser forms of regulation, such as
certification or registration, or even no regulation. For example, services provided
by [some professions] may not pose sufficient risk to health and safety to warrant
the full regulation or right to practice of licensure.”) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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extensive list of specialties including, but not limited to:
cosmetologists, polygraph examiners, florists, casket makers,
auctioneers, interior designers, real estate appraisers, social
workers, cemetery operators, fortune tellers, dental hygienist,
mussel dealers, maple dealers, photographers, reptile catchers,
and cat groomers. 23 The list is extensive and, at times, seemingly
arbitrary and absurd. 24 This extensive list of licensed professions
varies between the states, as do the requirements to obtain a
license. 25 While regulatory measures do serve an important
purpose in ensuring quality services, more often than not, these
practices place “burdens on workers, employers, and
consumers . . . [that] too often are inconsistent, inefficient, and
arbitrary.” 26
23. See Edlin & Rebecca Haw, supra note 22, at 1096 (“[N]early a third of
American workers need a state license to perform their job legally, and the trend
toward licensing is continuing.”); see also Paul J. Larkin, Public Choice Theory
and Occupational Licensing, 39 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 210 (2016) (listing
several professions licensed in the states); see also Alexandra Klein, Note, The
Freedom to Pursue a Common Calling, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 411, 416 (2015)
(naming a number of licensed professions and noting the absurdity of a number
of the professions that require a license to work); see also DICK M. CARPENTER ET
AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, LICENSE TO WORK: A NATIONAL STUDY OF BURDENS FROM
OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING 8 (2012), http://ij.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/licenseto
work1.pdf (classifying the requirements for 102 licensed occupations across the
United States) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
24. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 219 (“Some of the occupations found on that
list are odd, to say the least. Are the health, welfare, and safety of the community
really put at risk if society allows unlicensed florists, interior designers, and frog
famers to ply their trades?”); see also Klein, supra note 23, at 415 (“The list of
occupations subject to licensing can be quite absurd . . . .”); see also HAMILTON
DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 5 (explaining that occupations in some states
require licensing, while in other states, mere certification or registration is
required).
25. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 220 (discussing inconsistencies between the
states on licensing requirements generally, exemplified by the barber example, a
profession licensed by forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, each state
requiring a series of unique tests and certification hours); see also Edlin & Haw,
supra note 22, at 1095–97 (providing the example of cosmetologists, a profession
that requires, in some states, more certification hours than Emergency Medical
Technicians).
26. See THE WHITE HOUSE, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A FRAMEWORK FOR
POLICYMAKERS 7 (2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf [hereinafter WH FRAMEWORK]
(explaining the inconsistencies between the states on state licensed professions)
(on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
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A. What is Occupational Licensing?

Occupational regulation, including occupational licensing,
gained popularity during the twentieth century. 27 Licensing
requirements have become one of the “fastest growing labor
market institutions in the United States since World War II.” 28
Occupational regulation protects both consumers and
professionals, ensuring that services are provided only by qualified
personnel. 29 These regulations take three basic forms: registration,
certification, and licensing. 30 Registration, the least restrictive
form of regulation, 31 generally requires individuals interested in
pursuing certain employment to pay a fee or post a bond and file
their name, address, and qualification with the government to
ensure that practitioners can be reached in the event of a
complaint. 32 Registration does not deny the right to practice to any
27. See CAROLYN COX & SUSAN FOSTER, FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF OCCUPATIONAL REGULATION 1, 2–3 (1990), https://www.ftc.gov/system
/files/documents/reports/costs-benefits-occupational-regulation/cox_foster_-_
occupational_licensing.pdf (examining a brief history of occupational regulation
in the United States and the historical relevance of occupational licensing’s
relevance throughout the nation’s history) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also SHIMBERG, supra note 18, at 5
(discussing the history of occupational regulation); see also NAAG, supra note 17,
at 33 (“[Occupational licensing] has gained increasingly widespread acceptance
in the United States during the last century and especially in the last fifty years.
A review of the state codes for 1968–69 found almost 2,800 statutory provisions
requirement occupational licensing, with hundreds of occupations requiring a
license.”).
28. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22 (describing the historical
context in which occupational licensing gained increased relevance in the United
States).
29. See Rafael Gomez et al., Do Immigrants Gain or Lose by Occupational
Licensing?, 41 CAN. PUB. POL’Y S80, S81 (2015) (articulating the rationale for
occupational regulation, the various forms of occupational regulation, and the role
of the government to regulate the trade).
30. See Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of
Occupational Licensing, 48 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 676, 676 (2010) (“Occupational
regulation in the USA generally takes three forms.”).
31. See id. (explaining the process of obtaining registration with the
regulating body that oversees the profession).
32. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 7 n.6 (defining the two “other less
restrictive forms of occupational regulation . . .” registration and certification); see
also Larkin, supra note 23, at 210 (outlining the three basic forms of occupational
regulation and the regulatory bodies policing threshold requirements).
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registered person as long as they pay required fees. 33 Certification
is “an intermediate form of regulation” 34 or “right-to-title”
regulating professions that allow almost any individual with
varied levels of experience to perform the duties of the profession. 35
To prove an attained level of skill and knowledge required for
certification, applicants must complete a certifying examination,
administered by a state government agency or a private certifying
body, proving an achieved level of skill and knowledge for
certification. 36 Finally, the most restrictive form of occupational
regulation is licensure, often referred to as the “right to practice.” 37
As compared to registration and certification, licensure appears
frivolously complicated and expansive. 38
Occupational licensing is the “process where entry into an
occupation requires the permission of the government” 39 and “by
which governments establish qualifications required to practice
[the] trade or profession.” 40 The Council of State Governments
define licensure as:
33. See NAAG, supra note 17, at 33 (noting the registration fee requirement).
34. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 210 (“Certification . . . permits anyone to
practice in a particular field, but the government or a private association
identifies an applicant’s educational or skill level, typically based on an
examination, and issues a certificate to that effect.”).
35. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 30, at 677 (discussing the process of
obtaining a certification, comparing the practice to the other forms of occupational
licensure); see also WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 7 n.6 (defining certification,
or “right-to-title” regulation, describing that any person who passes an
examination is eligible to receive certification); see generally id. at 209 (describing
the three forms of occupational regulation).
36. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 30, at 677 (explaining the certification
process and the administrative bodies that assign certificates for participation);
see also NAAG, supra note 17 (“[C]ertification is not however, a prerequisite to
practice of the occupation. Some authorities content that certification or
registration are appropriate alternatives to licensing for many occupations.”).
37. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 30, at 677 (describing the
formulations of occupational regulation and their functions).
38. See id. (comparing licensure to registration and certification, and noting
that more than 800 occupation require a license in at least one state).
39. See Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 189,
191 (2000) (analyzing studies and criticism of occupational regulation in
America).
40. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 5 (providing evidence
of the effects of occupational licensing on a variety of factors, including wages and
professional entry).
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[T]he granting by some competent authority of a right or
permission to carry on a business or do an act which
otherwise would be illegal. The essential elements of
licensing involve the stipulation of circumstances under
which permission to perform an otherwise prohibited
activity may be granted—largely a legislative function;
and the actual granting of the permission in specific
cases—generally an administrative responsibility. 41

Due to the explosion of the service sector, an industry widely
covered by state licensing, the number of jobs requiring
occupational licenses in the United States has rapidly increased,
and the trend towards more licensing continues to grow. 42
According to a White House report released in 2015, more than a
third of jobs in the United State require some form of state
licensing, with the majority of these licenses administered by the
states themselves. 43

41. THE COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING
LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 5 (1952); see also PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE
STATES 134 (2004) (quoting the Council of State Government’s definition of
occupational licensing, and providing additional definitional context); see also
NAAG, supra note 17 (explaining the difference between occupational licensing
and other forms of state regulation of occupations).
42. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1093, 1095–96 (discussing one of the
reasons why the occupational licensing has increased so drastically since the
1950s); see also Marlene A. Lee & Mark Mather, U.S. Labor Trends, POPULATION
BULL. 3, 7 (June 2008), http://www.prb.org/pdf08/63.2uslabor.pdf (describing
trends in occupations since the 1950s, including a decrease in manufacturing
professions and an increase in service-related professions) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice); see also Larkin, supra
note 23, at 209 (“What you might not expect to hear is that lines of work requiring
an occupational license are among the fastest growing types of employment in the
United States.”); see also HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22
(“Occupational Licensing has been one of the fastest growing labor market
institutions in the United States since World War II.”); see also Kleiner &
Krueger, supra note 30, at 676 (“One of the fastest growing, yet least understood,
institutions in the U.S. labor market is occupational licensing. The movement to
a service-oriented economy from manufacturing, where unions and contracts were
prominent, created a demand for a ‘web of rules’ of the workplace that licensing
may have provided.”)
43. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 3 (“More than one-quarter of U.S.
workers now require a license to do their jobs, with most of these workers licensed
by the States. The share of workers licensed at the State level has risen fivefold.”).
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Further, since 1950, state-administered licenses have
increased five-fold. 44 Notwithstanding the number of jobs that
require occupational licenses and the historical prevalence of
occupational licensing practices, “the study of occupational
licensing has gone into partial eclipse.” 45 Despite the relative lack
of research conducted in this arena, the effects of the regulatory
practice are relevant and pertinent policy issues. 46
An extremely rigorous form of occupational regulation,
licensure requires the state to grant permission to an individual to
enter a field of employment. 47 This is often referred to as the “right
to practice.” 48 The majority of these occupations is regulated by
licensing boards on the state level and composed of “active
professionals, political appointees . . . and members of the public
appointed by an executive official.” 49 These boards, created by the
state legislature, define the qualifications necessary to receive
practice certifications within the occupation in question. 50
State legislatures typically grant professions the right to
essentially self-regulate. 51 This led to a self-regulated industry
44. See id. (describing the rate at which the number of state administered
occupational licenses grew over the past sixty years).
45. See Kleiner, supra note 39, at 190 (noting the relatively sparse research
conducted on current occupational licensing practices despite its prevalence in the
United States).
46. See TESKE, supra note 41, at 134 (“Occupational regulation covers [a
significant] percent of the American work force, so how states regulate, and the
effects of such regulation are important policy issues.”).
47. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 211 (explaining the extent of the licensing
process, requiring a different procedure at the federal, state, and local levels with
different processes).
48. See Kleiner & Krueger, supra note 30, at 676 (“One of the fastest-growing
yet least understood institutions in the US labour [sic.] market is occupational
licensing.”).
49. See Klein, supra note 23, at 416 (describing the process by which
licensing boards are created and the “hands-off” attitude assumed by the
appointing legislative bodies); see also Kleiner, supra note 39, at 191 (articulating
the compilation of boards licensing boards).
50. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 213 (“States have developed a common
licensing apparatus. Ordinarily, legislatures create licensing boards, and
governors frequently appoint members to those boards from within the profession
itself.”); see also NAAG, supra note 17 (discussing the legislatures role in
authorization of occupational licensing regimes); see generally S. DAVID YOUNG,
THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA 9–14 (1987)
(discussing occupational licensing in America).
51. See TESKE, supra note 41, at 135 (describing the traditional role of
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with very limited, or completely restricted, roles for bureaucratic
commissions and agencies to oversee any function of the
professional licensing arena. 52 The boards that do require
government appointments typically receive selection guidance
from the professional board itself. 53 Despite the domination of
these boards by active members of their respective industries,
professional boards are sanctioned by the state and are considered
a part of the state’s infrastructure. 54 Self-regulated boards have
been questioned by a variety of economists, raising concern that
these boards are inefficient and engage in corrupt practices. 55
To obtain licensure in one of these professions, these state
institutions typically require significant training hours,
qualification exams, and fees. 56 Most common requirements
include formal education in the targeted profession, prior
experience in the form of internships or apprenticeships,
administrative agency oversight of occupational licensing groups).
52. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 213 (articulating the different types of
commissions that form these administrative licensing boards); see also YOUNG,
supra note 50, at 29 (explaining that legislatures create the licensing boards and
the process); see also Simon Rottenberg, The Economics of Occupational
Licensing, in ASPECTS OF LABOR ECONOMICS 3, 14 (Universities-National Bureau
Committee for Economic Research ed., 1962) (discussing that state governors
typically appoint the legislature but they often appoint with guidance from the
existing board); see also Michael J. Phillips, Entry Restrictions in the Lochner
Court, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 405, 410 (1996) (describing the hypocrisy in licensing
board appointment systems and the process in which the system is established).
53. See Phillips, supra note 52, at 410 (noting that the legislature defines the
occupational qualifications, or empowers the board to do so, requiring formal
education, prior experience, internship, and evaluation of good character).
54. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1095–96 (drawing comparisons
between the creation of licensing boards and commodities boards or product
coalition groups and their common practices); see also MORRIS M. KLEINER,
LICENSING OCCUPATIONS: ENSURING QUALITY OR RESTRICTING COMPETITION? 65–96
(2006) (discussing the power that state sanctioned boards have under the state’s
umbrella); see also Kleiner, supra note 39, at 191 (explaining the composition of
state licensing boards).
55. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1096 (“Some boards use their power
to limit price competition or restrict the quantity of services available.”); see also
HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 12–13 (discussing the negligible
influence of occupational licensing on quality of service, if at all).
56. See Klein, supra note 23, at 416 (describing the licensing statutes and
requirements that potentially hinder individuals pursing licensed professions);
see also CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 8 (indicating that the licensing for
professions typically held by low-to-moderate-income workers are typically
unnecessary).
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examinations, or a certification of character and fitness. 57 In turn,
the licensing boards prepare the exams, sets the pass rate, reviews
the applicant’s qualifications, and adjudicates complaints against
individuals within the profession. 58 Variation of the licensing
processes described operated consistently since the early 1900s. 59
As of 2017, states are responsible for regulating these
occupations and professions without any significant or direct role
for the federal government. 60 These entities are often guarded from
any independent review or oversight from the state, as the state
typically allows the professional board to establish their own
procedures. 61 Theoretically, this regulatory practice serves the
public interest by remedying “an information asymmetry market
failure in which professionals know far more about their own
competence than do their consumers.” 62 To encourage these safety
measures and objectives, legislatures attempted to authorize
certain occupations to license and discipline their own
memberships. 63 In practice, occupational regulations provide entry
restrictions for these professions, bearing some similarity to

57. See Phillips, supra note 52, at 410 (articulating the “phenomenon of
occupational licensing” and the requirements involving formal schooling,
experience, personal attributes, and residency).
58. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 617 (explaining the duties of the licensing
board).
59. See id. (“The process has operated in a consistent manner for more than
a century.”).
60. See TESKE, supra note 41, at 133 (“The states regulate occupations and
professions with no significant, direct role for the federal government.”).
61. See id. at 207–08 (noting that reform groups argue for “stronger
legislative review of regulations and improvement in the oversight and review of
administrative decisions by independent third parties”).
62. See id. at 133 (describing the imbalance between consumers or
applicants and the licensing board itself); see, e.g., Jarod M. Bona, The Antitrust
Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their Own Exclusive Jurisdiction,
5 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 28, 45 (2011) (explaining the tendency of groups
and individual to further their own interests and the reach of their group’s
occupation, often to the detriment of consumers, interested applicants, and other
occupations); see also Edlin & Haw, supra note 23, at 1096 (“Licensing boards are
largely dominated by active members of their respective industries . . . [and] use
their power to limit price competition or restrict the quantity of services
available.”).
63. See NAAG, supra note 17 (discussing the objective of licensing regimes
and the purpose behind creating licensing associations).
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monopoly and competition regulation practices. 64 The outstanding
question considers whether occupational regulation serves the
interests of the public, consumers and the profession by improving
quality; or if the practice merely limits competition, raises prices
and furthers the interests of self-serving licensing groups. 65
Notably, both the interests of the consumer and the profession
would be furthered if occupational regulatory practices were
followed in perfect order and only applied to professions that posed
true threats to health and safety. 66 The concern of scholars across
the political spectrum is that these regulatory practices have come
to serve the profession and the licensing board rather than truly
protecting the public’s interest or consumer demand. 67
B. Origins of Occupational Licensing
Occupational regulation practices originate from the ancient
Babylonian Code to medieval European guilds. 68 In the United
States, evidence of occupational licensing regulations emerged as
early as the American colonies, subjecting bakers, ferry workers,
leather merchants, and innkeepers to the practice. 69 The creation
and growth of “modern day professions,” such as teachers, dentists,
and accountants, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, led to
a rise in self-regulating occupations, establishing set standards
64. See id. (paralleling occupational regulation and its comparisons to
various free market theories).
65. See generally CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23 (evaluating the harms
that occupational licensing professions ultimately apply to low-to-moderateincome professions).
66. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 5 (explaining the
rationale for occupational licensing boards and that the system would be less
complex if training requirements were related to training for improvements in
quality rather than arbitrary attempts to increase hours and if they were reserved
for occupations that potentially pose risks to public health or safety).
67. See generally Edlin & Haw, supra note 22 (comparing licensing boards to
cartels: colluding, acting purely out of self-interest and unethically blocking
competition within their industries).
68. See COX & FOSTER, supra note 27, at 2 (“Regulation of the professions can
be traced to the Code of Hammurabi in ancient Babylon and the guilds in
medieval Europe.”).
69. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 213–14 (explaining the prevalence of
occupational licensing regimes throughout western history).
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and guidelines of practice. 70 Between 1880 and 1930, there was an
significant increase of specialized scientific knowledge, giving rise
to new specialized fields. 71 This expansion in knowledge led to the
ability of fewer individuals to claim to be “generalists” and instead,
fell into the category of “specialist.” 72 The increasing complexity of
scientific knowledge created a call for more individuals to become
specialized in certain fields, or “specialists.” 73 During this time,
universities and other institutions of higher education emerged to
meet the demand of the consumer and of those seeking to acquire
the skills to pursue specialized professions. 74
The emergence of specialized professionals during the
Progressive Era, as well as integration of the national economy and
urbanization, led to significant changes in the labor market
seeking expert services from this new class of specifically educated
specialists. 75 Before this time, markets relied on and selected
“expert” specialists within communities based on reputation. 76
With the rise in urbanization, local reputations were less effective,
as services offered became more varied, common, and
anonymous. 77 Groups began to develop professional societies to
70. See Marc T. Law & Sukkoo Kim, Specialization and Regulation: The Rise
of Professionals and the Emergence of Occupational Licensing 3 (Nat’l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10467, 2004) http://www.nber.org/papers
/w10467.pdf (noting that in 1900, only four percent of Americans were engaged in
“learned professions,” while the number rose to twenty percent by 2000) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
71. See id. at 9 (explaining the context from which occupational licensing
was created and noting the rapid expansion in the number of scientific periodicals
published from the eighteenth century to the mid-twentieth).
72. See id. at 10 (comparing a generalist versus a specialist and discussing
the historic relevance of the terms).
73. See id. (describing how it may have been possible for someone like
Leonardo da Vinci to master several disciplines in the 1500s, but “it was clearly
not feasible to be a master of more than one of these fields by the early 1900s”).
74. See id. (contextualizing the rise in educational institutions that led to
educational requirements in occupational licensing regimes, specifically the
longer periods of formal educational required to engage in these professions).
75. See id. (describing how specialized professional markets before the
progressive era in the United States relied heavily on local generalists, chosen
through word of mouth and reputation).
76. See id. at 10–11 (“This movement of the population out of the countryside
and into increasingly dense cities was accompanied by the rise of impersonal
exchange as the dominant form of market interaction.”).
77. See id. at 11 (“Specialization and the rise of impersonal exchange created
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substitute for local reputation. 78 Membership requirements in
these societies required minimum standards, theoretically
allowing community members to readily trust the quality of service
members of these groups provided. 79 Membership requirements
was often very low, so it became increasingly difficult for service
providers to establish a good reputation for the quality of their
services. 80
Occupational licensing requirements established by state
governments emerged in response to the specialization of
professions and the rise of professional services. 81 As early as 1870,
states began to adopt occupational licensing laws. 82 Licensing laws
continued to grow over the next several decades, and these early
occupational regulation regimes began to crystallize during the
early 1900s. 83 Since World War II, “occupational licensing has been
among the fastest growing labor market institutions in the United

problems for producers and consumers in a wide variety of markets.”).
78. See id. (explaining that membership in professional societies or
organization helped to substitute for local reputation, allowing access to
specialists in a desired field).
79. See id. (noting that relying on members of these societies came with a
high level of risk, because the quality of service these individuals provided was
quite varied).
80. See id. (“Membership in key professional society or associations [was] a
partial substitute for local reputation, but in an environment where professional
societies were proliferating in nearly every occupation, . . . the requirements for
membership . . . were often . . . low, the signalizing value associated with
membership in any given society . . . [was not] high.”).
81. See COX & FOSTER, supra note 27, at 11 (“Specialization and the rise of
impersonal exchange in the market for professional services were accompanied
by a sudden surge in state government occupational licensing regulation.”).
82. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 213 (“In the nineteenth-century America,
states and localities licensed barbers, embalmers, horseshoers, boarding house
operators, insurance agents, midwives, pawnbrokers, physicians, real-estate
brokers, steamboat operators, undertakers, and veterinarians.”)
83. See id. (describing the increase of occupational licensing in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century and listing the variety of occupations that
required licensing at that time); see also Law & Kim, supra note 70, at 3–6
(outlining the history of occupational licensing and various theories that lead to
its creation).
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States” 84 and the share of workers with state issued occupational
license have risen “five-fold since the 1950s.” 85
C. The History of Free Market Theory and Occupational
Licensing’s Influences
The history of occupational regulation practices provides
context in economic liberty ideals. Economic liberty is defined as
the “right to pursue an honest living in a business or profession
free from arbitrary government interference.” 86 The Founding
Fathers protected economic liberty as a natural right, considering
the ability to conduct business and earn money among the most
important governmental interest. 87 Political theorist Adam Smith
believed that governments should not interfere in business,
arguing that a free market model without the burden of market
subsidies or “favors,” would serve the best interests of the
consumer and business. 88
84. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 2 (explaining the
increase in occupational licensing discoveries and their important influence on
wage determination, benefits, and employment and prices in ways that impose
costs on society with questionable added benefit).
85. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 7 (quantifying the increase in
these occupations).
86. See CLINT BOLICK, DAVID’S HAMMER, THE CASE FOR AN ACTIVIST JUDICIARY
98 (2007) (appealing to the reasoning of early American free-market economic
theorists). Milton Friedman also described an “essential part of economic
freedom” as the:
[F]reedom to use the resources we possess in accordance with our own
values—freedom to enter any occupation, engage in any business
enterprise, buy from and sell to anyone else, so long as we do so on a
strictly voluntary basis and do not resort to force in order to coerce
others. Today you are not free to offer your services as a lawyer, a
physician, a dentist, a plumber, a barber, a mortician, or engage in a
host of other occupations, without first getting a permit or license from
a government official.
MILTON FRIEDMAN & ROSE FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE: A PERSONAL STATEMENT 66
(1979).
87. See Lana Harfoush, Grave Consequences for Economic Liberty: The
Funeral Industry’s Protectionist Occupational Licensing Scheme, the Circuit Split,
and Why It Matters, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 135, 137 (2011) (describing
the important of economic liberty at the nation’s founding).
88. See id. at 137–38 (summarizing Adam Smith’s theory, promoting
business rights without government interference).
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Further, in Smith’s Wealth of Nations, he argued against
regulation or restriction of a worker in any capacity, arguing that
this regulation hinders the working man from:
[E]mploying this strength and dexterity [of his hands] . . .
is a plain violation of this most sacred property. It is a
manifest encroachment upon the just liberty both of the
workman, and of those who might be disposed to employ
him. As it hinders the one from working at what he thinks
proper, so it hinders the others from employing whom
they think proper. To judge whether he is fit to be
employed, may surely be trusted to the discretion of the
employers whose interest it so much concerns. The
affected anxiety of the law-giver lest they should employ
an improper person, is evidently as impertinent as it is
oppressive. The institution . . . can give no security that
insufficient workmanship shall not be frequently be
exposed to public sale. 89
This sentiment embodies the attitudes toward suggestions of the
monopolization of business prior to the nation’s founding. 90 In fact,
the Founder’s mindset was riddled with “concern about the evils of
state-granted monopolies.” 91 Further, the Framers of the
89. See Kleiner, supra note 39, at 189 (furthering the thesis that
apprenticeships are not a true method of quality assurance nor are they useful in
calculating the skill or workmanship of a potential candidate for licensure
(quoting ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS Book I, Chapter 10, Part II (2016))).
90. See Clark Niely, No Such Thing: Litigating Under the Rational Basis
Test, 1 NYU J. L. & Liberty 897, 900 (2005) (explaining the historical lead up to
monopolies in American since before the American Revolution). As articulated by
Clark Niely:
Government creation of occupational monopolies like these at the
behest of politically powerful special interests has a long, sordid, and
well-documented history at common law. . . . Indeed, one of the iconic
events leading up to the American Revolution—the Boston Tea Party—
was prompted by the colonists’ frustration with (and attempts to avoid)
the legal monopoly on the importation of tea that had been granted by
the Crown to the East India Company.
Id.
91. See id. at 900 (“Concern about the evils of state-granted monopolies was
so prevalent at the founding that four states—Massachusetts, North Carolina,
New Hampshire, and New York—included prohibition against monopolies in
their proposed bill of rights when ratifying the Constitution.”); see also THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: PART ONE: SEPTEMBER 1787 TO FEBRUARY 1788, at
944 (Bernard Baylin ed., 1993) (describing the conversation on economic rights in
ratifying conventions of the U.S. Constitution).
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Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause
“intended to protect, . . . the traditional right to earn a living free
from unreasonable interference.” 92 It is argued that the clause was
enacted in response to occupational licensing restrictions meant to
exclude newly freed slaves from obtaining employment, earning a
living, or owning property. 93
Regulation of entry into occupations date as far back as the
Middle Ages, but has gained widespread acceptance in the United
States over the last 150 years. 94 Occupational licensing regimes
dramatically increased at the turn of the twentieth century,
correlating with the decrease in protection of economic liberties
due to mass immigration from patterns of Irish immigrants,
European Jews, Catholics, Asians, and African Americans. 95 In
order for businesses and workers to protect their jobs and
livelihoods in light of the arrival and availability of new cheap
labor, licensing laws were applied with increased vigor. 96 While
these laws were intended to protect the jobs of these classes, they
ultimately lead to exclusionary boundaries of these immigrant and
recently politically disenfranchised groups, restricting the access
to these professions. 97 The application of these laws, initially
92. See Harfoush, supra note 87, at 138 (describing the restrictive regime
Occupational Licensing imposed on African Americans in the aftermath of the
Civil War and the reparations intended by the Fourteenth Amendment to remedy
this regime).
93. See id. (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities clause
was ‘intended to protect, among other things, the traditional right to earn a living
from unreasonable interference.’”).
94. See NAAG, supra note 17 (“The requirement that an individual be
licensed in order to practice has been extended to an increasing number of
professions and occupations. It has gained an increasingly widespread acceptance
in the United States during the last century and especially in the last 50 years.”).
95. See id. (explaining the correlative shift in occupational licensing
practices as related to increased immigration, Irish and other European
immigrants, as well as the political establishment of previously disenfranchised
groups such as African Americans, Catholics, and, in some cases, women).
96. See Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State
Interest? Four Recent Cases Test the Boundaries 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023,
1028 (2005) (“The exercise of the police power is available only for the purpose of
promoting the general welfare . . . . It cannot be used to promote private gain or
advantage . . . . Unfortunately . . . occupational licensing is subject to rentseeking.”).
97. See id. (“Contrary to their image as devices for protecting the public,
licensing laws frequently do nothing more that “benefit . . . the practitioners who

280

24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 261 (2017)

intended to promote public health and safety, became a perverted
tool for hindering competition. 98
D. Who Feels the Effects of Occupational Licensing?
Despite the eruption in occupational licensing laws in the last
several decades, 99 there is little scholarly attention directed to the
phenomenon that twice as many workers are covered by licensing
statutes than are affected by minimum wage statutes or union
labor contracts. 100
It is undeniable that occupational licensing practices are
growing, affecting the livelihoods of thousands of Americans,
ranging from “dentists, doctors, lawyers, fortune tellers, and frog
farmers [that] are now licensed occupation in either all or some
U.S. states.” 101 Occupational regulation, seemingly wholly
disconnected from party-lines, effect a growing body of workers
and occupations. 102 With relatively little scholarship on the issue,
the practice irrefutably affects a large number of Americans. 103
Many people, including individuals licensed in these professions,

are in the industry at the time the restrictions are imposed.”).
98. See id. (“The result, as we shall see, is that licensing laws, which limit
economic opportunity, were originally allowed insofar as they protect the public
health and safety—but have, as economists predicted, become perverted into a
tool for obstructing competition.”).
99. See Chris Burks, The Right to Work: The Rise in Occupational Licensing
Litigation Comes to Arkansas 51-SPG ARK. L. 22, 22–23 (2016) (discussing the
growth of occupational licensing in economic theory).
100. See id. (describing the findings of various institutions finding the
prevalence of the practice despite lack of understanding toward the subject).
101. See id. at 23 (“We can now say with certainty that occupational licensing
is growing.”); see also Larkin, supra note 23, at 218–19 (explaining the expansive
nature of occupational licensing regimes).
102. See Burks, supra note 99, at 23 (discussing that more than a quarter of
U.S. workers now require a license to do their jobs, the phenomena stemming
from the increase in the number of professions requiring a license and due to the
changing composition of the workforce); see also WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26,
at 19–23 (describing the uptick and occupational licenses since World War II and
the reasons for the phenomena).
103. See Burks, supra note 99, at 23 (“Occupational regulation seems wholly
disconnected from party-specific ideology.”).
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do not understand the way the system works and how it affects
consumers. 104
Occupational licensing, and regulation generally, is justified
by the Public Interest or Market Failure Theory. 105 Developed in
the 1930s, “welfare economic theory” 106 or the Market Failure
Theory, suggests that government should regulate areas that the
market cannot adequately perform due to structural flaws such as
externalities, transaction costs, natural monopolies, and other
various collection action problems. 107
Public Interest Theory introduces several concerns. 108 Firs,
unwarranted or mistaken government intervention in market
issues are difficult to remedy, as the passage of legislation through
Congress is a lengthy process and laws remain in effect absent a
repeal or sunset deadline. 109 While the issues calling for the
regulation “may be transient . . . the statues passed to remedy

104. See SHIMBERG, supra note 18, at 11 (“Although there has been a marked
increase in public discussion about occupational licensing, many people, including
active professionals, do not fully understand how the system works, how it affects
consumers, what critics and defenders are saying, and what remedies are being
proposed to deal with alleged shortcomings.”).
105. Larkin, supra note 23, at 224 (describing the Market Failure Theory and
how it inspires regulation); see, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition
Among Pressure Groups for Political influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371, 383 (1983)
(“This analysis unifies the view that governments correct market failures with
the view that they favor the politically powerful”); see generally James M.
Buchanan, Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory
and Its Normative Implications, in THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE-II 11 (James
M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison eds., 1984) (discussing public choice theory).
106. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 224 (explaining the welfare economic theory
that emerged in the 1930s); see also ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF
WELFARE 3–22 (4th ed. 1932) (describing welfare economic theory as a form of
“republicanism” or “civic virtue” suggesting that government officials should act
in the interest of the pubic good rather than their own personal interests).
107. See generally Larkin, supra note 23, at 224 (providing definitions of the
Market Failure Theory).
108. See id. at 225 (describing perceived flaws of Public Interest Theory).
109. See id. at 225 (“Mistaken government interventions can be more difficult
to remedy than market imperfections. The Constitution makes the passage of
legislation difficult, so, once enacted, laws do not fade away. Absent an expiration
date, laws remain in effect until they are repealed or held unconstitutional.”); see
also District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson, Co., 346 U.S. 100, 113–14 (1953)
(stating that local laws should be respected “in the interest of peace and order”
and to uphold the sovereignty of the locality).
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them may last forever.” 110 Secondly, Market Failure Theory also
aggrandizes the motives of public officials, assuming that they
always act in the best interest of the nation, despite presence of
evidence to the contrary. 111 Finally, Public Interest Theory does
not explain, especially in the occupational licensing context, that
consumers and private individuals do not urge governments to
adopt licensing regimes. 112 Contrarily, private firms request that
licensing regimes be established, the opposite of what Public
Interest Theory predicts. 113
E. Who Benefits from Occupational Licensing?
Licensing regulation is justified by claims that these statues
improve the health and safety of both the consumer and the
practitioner. 114 The objective of licensing is to shield the public
from potentially incompetent or dishonest practitioners and to
110. See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 23, at 225.
111. See id. at 225–26 (discussing the “normative wishings” phenomena,
assuming that public officials act in the nation’s interest, even with evidence
indicating otherwise); see also Douglas Ginsberg, A New Economic Theory of
Regulation: Rent Extraction Rather than Rent Creation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1771
(1997) (“Once upon a time, people have believed that the government regulated
various industries in the ‘the public interest.’”); see also JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE
GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS 124 (3d ed. 2008) (“Reformers rarely acknowledged that much economic
legislation, although couched in terms of general benefits, served selfish special
interests.”).
112. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 226 (explaining the irony of Public Interest
Theory in its application to occupational licensing); see also Lawrence M.
Friedman, Freedom of Contract and Occupational Licensing 1890-1910: A Legal
and Social Study, 53 CAL. L. REV. 487, 503 (1965) (“It has been sufficiently
demonstrated how much the licensing urge flowed from the needs of the licensed
occupations. The state did not impose ‘friendly’ licensing; rather, this licensing
was actively sought by the regulated.”); see also Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse of
Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 11 (1976) (“Licensing has only
infrequently been imposed upon an occupation against its wishes.”).
113. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 226 (“Finally, Public Interest Theory does
not explain a curious and stubborn fact: Private individuals rarely urge
governments to adopt licensing regimes, but private firms often do—conduct that
is the exact opposite of what Public Interest Theory predicts.”).
114. See id. at 211 (“A state adopts registration, certification, and license
requirements under its ‘police power’ the inherent sovereign authority to regulate
private conducts for the purpose of protecting the health, safety, and welfare of
its residents.”).
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assure that practitioners have at least a minimum standard of
proficiency within the profession. 115 Further, licensing protects
consumers, and the public generally, against potentially
dangerous practitioners. 116 This is especially relevant to
occupations where it is difficult for consumers to evaluate the
quality of the provider beforehand or when the evaluation of the
specified profession requires a certain degree of expertise. 117 As
professions become more specialized, a certain level of expertise,
education, and training is essential to the profession. 118 Licensing
requirements compensate for the “information asymmetry”
between practitioners and consumers. 119
Licensing requirements therefore reduce “consumer fear” of
dissatisfaction or injury by a service. In theory, advocates suggest
that this results in enhanced consumer demand for licensed
services. 120 Licensing requirements have also been found to
115. See SHIMBERG, supra note 18, at 11 (“Although there has been a marked
increase in public discussion about occupational licensing, many people, including
active professionals, do not fully understand how the system works, how it affects
consumers, what critics and defenders are saying, and what remedies are being
proposed to deal with alleged shortcomings.”).
116. See NAAG, supra note 17 (“One objective of licensing is to protect the
public from incompetent or dishonest practitioners, and to assure the public of a
minimum standard of proficiency in the licensed occupation.”).
117. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 11 (explaining when occupational
licensing is valued to identify qualified professionals).
118. See NAAG, supra note 17, at 33 (admitting the importance and value in
training programs, education, and certification in preparing individuals for
certain professions).
119. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 222 (“The classic justification is information
asymmetry. Consumers lack the knowledge and expertise required to judge the
qualifications of different service-providers and lack the time necessary to acquire
such knowledge and expertise. Licensing requirements compensate for that
shortcoming by setting minimum qualifications.”); see also Kenneth Arrrow,
Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. L. REV.
941, 946, 966 (1963) (“When there is uncertainty, information or knowledge
becomes a commodity. Like other commodities, it has a cost of production and a
cost of transmission . . . . These are designed to reduce the uncertainty in the
mind of the consumer as to the quality of product insofar as this is possible.”).
120. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 223 (“Because consumers are generally risk
averse, licensing requirements may reduce consumer fear of being dissatisfied or
injured by a particular service, which would enhance consumer demand, thereby
benefitting an entire community as consumers purchase additional local
services.”); see also Kleiner, supra note 39, at 192 (“The existence of licenses may
minimize consumer uncertainty over the quality of the licensed service and
increase the overall demand for the service”).
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encourage service-providers to invest in additional training to
market more favorably to consumers. 121 Licensing practices can
therefore elevate the prominence of the profession as a whole. 122
As a result, studies have shown that occupational licensing
increases employment prospects of licensed workers and can raise
their wages as much as fifteen percent and enhance other benefits,
such as health coverage and retirement packages. 123
Licensing has often been sought by the industry in question
itself; arguing that these regimes ensure high-quality
professionals, continuing education requirements, as well as some
suggestion that licensed individuals earn better wages. As
discussed in the next section, however, these benefits to forming
occupational licensing regimes are called into question. 124 More
121. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 223 (“Also, a licensing requirement could
encourage service-providers to invest in their human capital through, for
instance, additional education or training, because they will not fear being
underpriced by less qualified rivals.”); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods.,
Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 890–91 (explaining that vertical restraints are
sometimes necessary to enhance competition within the occupation to prevent
outside completion).
122. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 223 (suggesting quality standards may
prevent market failure due to uncertainty of information and may be desirable
when a higher price attracts a variety of suppliers).
123. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 4–6 (describing
studies that suggest that occupational licensing improves employment prospects
and provides additional monetary incentives); see also Kleiner & Krueger, supra
note 30, at 685 (finding that licensed professions earn wages fifteen percent
higher than their competitive non-licensed counterparts).
124. See SHIMBERG, supra note 18, at 6 (quoting Walter Gellhorn, The Abuse
of Occupational Licensing, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 11 (1976)) (explaining the
detriments of licensing requirements). Benjamin Shimberg articulates:
[T]he licensing has been eagerly sought—always on the purported
ground that licensure protects the uninformed public against
incompetence and dishonesty, but invariably with the consequence
that members of the licensed group become protected from the new
comers. That restricting access is the real purpose and not merely a
side effect can scarcely be doubted. Licensing, imposed ostensibly to
protect the public almost always impedes only those who desire to
enter the occupation or profession; those already in practice remain
entrenched without a demonstration of fitness or probity. The
self-interested proponents of a new licensing law generally constitute
a more effective political form than the citizens who, if aware of the
matter at all, have no special interest which moves them to organize in
opposition.
Id.
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often than not, these regimes are created to meet self-serving
ends. 125
Undoubtedly,
heightened
and
continued
education
requirements do improve the quality of professionals, benefitting
consumers without creating undue barriers to consumer access. 126
It follows that the practice would be exclusionary to individuals
that are unqualified to work. In theory, the requirements found in
licensing statutes should be based on careful analysis of the
occupation in question to determine what object minimum level of
knowledge, skill, ability, or other characteristics are required to
meet the demands of the profession. 127 Considering that one of the
strongest arguments in favor of licensing includes consumer
safety, it follows that the standards should demonstrate a
commitment to ensuring that heightened safety standards remain
once admitted into the licensing regime. 128
Surprisingly, there is limited data indicating what measures
should determine the minimum entry requirements. 129 Scholars
suggest that the requirements found in licensing statues are more
often dictated by custom. 130 Further, despite the emphasis on the
applicant’s dedication to consumer safety, including a standard
concerning “good moral character,” there is no standard within the
statute that applies to current practitioners. 131 In fact, studies
suggest that the rise of occupational licensing has in fact reduced
employment and increased prices and wages of licensed workers
125. See id. (describing the barriers to entry, transaction costs, and special
interests that emerge due to licensing requirements).
126. See id. at 35 (discussing the function of occupational licensing to prevent
unqualified individuals from practicing).
127. See Besley & Burgess, supra note 15, at 35 (“Many of the requirements
found in licensing statutes are there by dint of custom. They are seldom based on
a careful analysis of the job to determine objectively what minimum level of
knowledge, skill, ability, or other characteristics are necessary for practice in the
given occupation.”).
128. See id. at 35–36 (questioning why the same high standards are not
applied to individuals already in the profession).
129. See id. at 35 (“Seldom has research been conducted to establish minimum
standards.”).
130. See id. (explaining that licensing statutes tend to be unspecific and
dictated by custom).
131. See id. (“Current petitioners are usually exempted from new statutory
requirements.”).
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more often than it has improved the quality and safety of
service. 132
F. Who is Hurt by Occupational Licensing? 133
Ostensibly, licensing requirements protect public health and
safety, and from the risk of hiring an unqualified practitioner. 134
Theoretically, if occupational licensing strictly served as a
protection for public health and safety measures as well as a
protection against faulty or corrupt practitioners, these groups
would prove extremely beneficial to society. 135 While some of the
professions should require licensing requirements, strict
regulatory overreach should be deemed unnecessary for many of
the service-based licensing agreements common throughout the
states today.
Licensing establishment systems appear to do more harm
than good, especially for low- to moderate-income workers, and the
difficulties in entering an occupation often do not align with any
public health or safety risk it may possess. 136 Citing protectionist
132. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 6 (citing economic
studies that show that occupational licensing reduces employment and failed to
improve the quality and safety of services); see also Kleiner & Krueger, supra note
30, at 685 (showing evidence where occupational licensing reduced employment,
did not increase wages for workers, and did not improve service quality).
133. See Timothy Sandefur, Is Economic Exclusion a Legitimate State
Interest? Four Recent Cases Test the Boundaries, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1023
(2005) (exploring four case studies which raise “the issue of whether regulations
designed for no other purpose than to protect political insiders from fair economic
competition meet the standards of the Fourteenth Amendment”).
134. See Martin Austermuhle, U.S. Senator Takes Aim at D.C. Over . . . .
Occupational Licensing, WAMU.ORG (July 14, 2016), https://wamu.org
/story/16/07/14/us_senator_takes_aim_at_dc_over_occupational_licensing/
(“[T]he purpose of licensing requirements is to protect public health and
safety . . . . What about truck drivers, athletic trainers, hair stylists, florists . . . ?
It’s hard to see why people who want to work in these jobs should . . . obtain
government permission before they can legally be hired.”) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
135. See generally COX & FOSTER, supra note 27, at 4–5 (discussing the
rationale for occupational licensing in addition to the consequences of
occupational licensing).
136. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 13 (“Most research does not find
that licensing improves quality or public health and safety . . . .”); see also id. at v
(“Many occupational licensing schemes do not appear to realize their goal of
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public health and safety issues, 137 licensing measures have come
to outweigh these concerns and have caused gross reductions in
economic growth and entrepreneurship, and, in fact,
disproportionately burden blue collar workers, young applicants,
minorities, and immigrants. 138 In practice, licensing requirement
created restrictive anti-competitive industries across the states. 139
Notably, these licensing regimes have come to harm the very group
that they were created to protect: the consumers themselves. 140
The function of occupational licensing boards has come to
serve limits on entrance into the profession, allowing members of
the trade to avoid competition and raise prices. Often, the change
in price does not correspond with an improvement of service. 141
Considering that these boards are self-regulated, the efficacy of the
system has been called into question. One scholar explained:
If professional groups are made the custodians of
professional licensing, then the question should be asked,
“who guards these guardians?” Since licensing bodies
increasing the quality of these professional’s services.”); see also Kleiner, supra
note 54, at 48–52, 56 (“Overall, few of these studies demand quality show
significant benefits of occupational regulation.”).
137. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 6 (“Indeed, economic
studies have demonstrated far more cases where occupational licensing has
reduced employment and increased prices and wages of licensed workers than
where it has improved the quality and safety of services.”).
138. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 5 (describing why these groups
are often the victim of these restrictions and the lopsided nature of the
legislation).
139. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (framing the problem of
occupational licensing for American workers due to economic restraints as well
an anti-competition measures); see also HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note
22, at 12 (explaining that licensing limits the pool of new workers as well as
consumer access to competition, therefore creating a selected pool of individuals
unduly protected).
140. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 13 (“In fact, standard
economic models imply that the restrictions from occupational licensing can
result in up to 2.85 million fewer jobs nationwide, with an annual cost to
consumers of $203 billion.”).
141. Id.; see also Larkin, supra note 23, at 236 (explaining the possibility for
a decrease in quality of service when competition is hindered); see also Hoover v.
Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 584 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[P]rivate regulation
of market entry, prices, or output may be designed to confer monopoly profits on
members of an industry at the expense of the consuming public . . . . [P]rivate
parties have used licensing to advance their own interests in restraining
competition at the expense of the public interest.”).
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have a public role, then the issue becomes one of ensuring
the responsibility of these bodies. In no avenue of life can
government give a blank check to any group of men. Nor
should one be given to the professions. To the degree to
which licensing boards exercise a public function, no
phase of their operation can ever be immune from public
scrutiny. 142

Disciplinary actions are rarely ever pursued, despite the extensive
investigative, prosecutorial, adjudicatory, and punitive powers
typically released by these professions. 143 Rather than increase
services to consumers and service providers, the industry itself
benefits the most from licensing regimes, especially when demand
for the service is “inelastic,” when there are limited alternatives,
or when the industry can define qualifications. 144
Active members on the licensing boards are the main
beneficiaries occupational licensing professions. They set limits to
entry, therefore insulating themselves from competition,
burdening professionals seeking entrance, and raising prices of the
product, a burden born by the consumer. 145 These boards use their
unchecked power to make it more difficult to enter the
142. R.J. Frye, Government and Licensing, UNIV. OF ALA. BUREAU OF PUB.
ADMIN. 76 (1958), reprinted in NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYS GENERAL,
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ISSUES IN PRICE MAINTENANCE AND OCCUPATIONAL
LICENSING 33 (The National Association of Attorneys General: Committee on the
Office of Attorney General, June 1975).
143. See TESKE, supra note 41, at 135 (explaining self-regulation as it relates
to licensing boards and the lack-luster process of administrative review). Paul
Teske also notes:
Such self-regulation left a limited role—or even none—for the type of
bureaucratic commissions and agencies that are influential
independent sources of policy and implementation in the other areas of
state regulation . . . . [T]he boards, with most appointments usually
made by governors based on nominations from the sate professional
associations, until recently were composed almost exclusively of
members of the regulated profession. As a result, disciplinary action
against professionals was quite rare, despite the fact that boards often
hold impressive investigative, prosecutorial, adjudicatory, and
punishment powers on paper.
Id. at 135.
144. See Larkin, supra note 23, at 237 (describing the anticompetitive nature
of the licensing boards).
145. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 6 (citing the limited
benefits of occupational regulation for consumers).
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occupation, 146 to limit price competition, or limit the number of
services available to the consumer. 147 Many boards have used their
power to engage in anticompetitive measures, making entrance
into the market incredibly burdensome. 148 These measures include
specific training requirements, including hourly or daily
minimums, examinations, courses of studies, and fees. 149 For lowto moderate-income workers, these require an average of $209 in
entrance fees, an examination, and almost a year of education and
training. 150
These entrance measures prove prohibitive to entry, especially
for lower-income practitioners. 151 Many licensed professions
throughout the states are well-suited for individuals entering or
re-entering the economy, typically composed of young workers,
immigrants, minorities, or blue collar individuals. 152 These
entrance requirements vary by state. In Arizona, a state
infamously ranked as one of the most “onerously licensed state for
low- and moderate-income workers” cost of entry nears $800,
requires an average of almost 1,500 days of education and
experience, and requires passage of two exams. 153 By creating
restrictive entry criteria including these education and training
146. See id. at 5 (“[E]conomic studies have demonstrated far more cases where
occupational licensing has reduced employment and increased prices and wages
of licensed workers than where it has improved the quality and safety of
services.”).
147. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1095–96 (“Licensing boards are
largely dominated by active members of their respective industries who meet to
agree on ways to limit the entry of new competitors.”).
148. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, at 1096 (highlighting the corruption of
exclusionary occupational licensing boards).
149. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 6 (articulating the forms of
obtaining an occupational license for a profession); see also HAMILTON DISCUSSION
PAPER, supra note 22, at 11–13 (describing lengthy training requirements for
different licensed professions).
150. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 6 (noting the significant impact
these regimes have on workers traditionally considered “blue collar” workers).
151. See id. at 20 (discussing the hardship that these requirements have for
this group of individuals).
152. See id. (explaining as an example, that carpenters and cabinet makers,
licensed in thirty states, on average require nearly $300 worth of entrance fees,
passage of an exam, and 450 days of training and education.)
153. See id. at 40 (noting that Arizona is among the top five most burdensome
states for occupational licensing, in addition to Hawaii, Arkansas, Nevada, and
Florida).
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requirements, the boards control the market, thus creating
significant final benefits for the board and for the members of the
industry. As a result, occupations requiring a license in these
states perpetuate their licensure to an unfair advantage, using
measures to “choke out the competition” and demanding “higher
prices without delivering improved products or services.” 154
Scholars have gone so far as to suggest that these actions violate
the Sherman Act, 155 but have gone unpunished, insulated by the
act’s failure to mention actions sanctioned by the state, and
therefore outside of the reach of the act itself. 156
In addition, occupational licensing requirement restrictions
result in more than two million fewer jobs nationwide, costing
consumers more than $100 billion annually. 157 This is a result of
the burdensome entry requirements, that many skilled low- to
moderate-income workers simply cannot afford. 158 In addition,
studies suggest that proof indicating quality enhancements do not
in fact offset price increases from licensing measures, especially in
positions that do not require unique qualifications that could pose
a danger to the health or safety of the public, such as cosmetology,
frog farming, or casket-making. 159 Low- to moderate-income
154. See Dick Carpenter & Chip Mellor, Editorial, Breaking Down
‘Bottleneckers:’ Form Music Therapists to Funeral Directors, Licensing Schemes
Keep Out Competition, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2016, 3:50 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/breaking-down-bottleneckers-1479680470
(scrutinizing
occupational
licensing regulations that constrain economic growth and indicating that despite
bipartisan support for the reform, that the reform will likely face opposition from
members of the licensed occupations) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal
of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
155. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2012) (“Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”).
156. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1096 n.5 (“The Sherman Act makes
no mention of the state as such, and gives no hint that it was intended to restrain
state action or official action directed by a state.” (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317
U.S. 341, 351 (1943))).
157. See generally HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 6
(describing the economic burden that occupational licensing pushes onto the
consumer); see also id. at 1099 (discussing the economic harm associated with
allowing professions to control their own licensing regimes).
158. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 9 (outlining the entry
requirements prohibitive to low- to moderate income workers and the hypocrisy
of the requirements, considering the nature of many of these licensed professions).
159. See WH FRAMEWORK, supra note 26, at 13 (highlighting the increased
harm facing licensed occupations that target service industries, or lower income
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workers pursuing the service-based professions—such as a
cosmetologist or cabinet maker—face a much different reality than
those pursuing higher-paid licensed professions. 160 These
individuals often do not have the same resources as those pursuing
a career in medicine or the law. 161
In addition, the occupations that drive up the statistic
suggesting that licensed professions receive higher wages include
occupations such as lawyer, dentist, or architect. 162 The reality is
that there is no significant difference in wages between unlicensed
and licensed professionals, traditionally considered to be blue
collar. 163 In fact, if an occupation is unlicensed in other states, if
the regulatory burdens are high compared to other states, or if the
burdens are high compared to other occupation with even greater
safety risks, it is suggested that the licensing regime is an
unnecessary or needlessly burdensome licensing scheme
unjustified by legitimate health and safety concerns. 164 This is
often the case for this pool of professions.
Licensing does not guarantee improvements in service quality
nor does it protect the consumers from health or safety risks. 165 In
professions).
160. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 7 (articulating the variance
between states in licensure requirements, as well as, the variance in necessity
between the types of professions low- to moderate-income individuals are
pursuing and calling into question the need for such severe burdens).
161. See id. (“Such licensure hurdles are likely exceptionally burdensome for
lower-income workers, particularly compared to higher-paid occupations like
physicians, attorneys and the like . . . . [T]ypically [lower-income workers] have
fewer resources than those pursuing high-income occupations.”).
162. See id. (noting that the individuals that do clear the financial and
training burdens typically make “markedly less” annually than the national
average for the profession or for lower class workers generally).
163. See id. at 11 (discussing the large demographic of individuals seeking or
engaged in licensed occupations who have a college degree or less).
164. See id. at 35–36 (providing a series of threshold questions suggesting
that a licensing scheme is unnecessary or needlessly burdensome).
165. See Craigmiles v. Giles, 312 F.3d 220, 226 (6th Cir. 2002) (arguing that
nothing prevents licensed practitioners from selling poor quality goods at a high
price and that licensing requirements bear no rational relationship to increasing
the quality of a good or service); see also id. at 8 (suggesting that there is little
evidence that government licenses protects public health and safety or improve
the quality or product of services, but rather that licensing actually reduces
opportunity and increases consumer cost); see also Klein, supra note 23, at 429
(“Occupational licensing does not guarantee public safety or product quality.”).
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fact, while occupational practitioners often lobby state legislators
on behalf of their licensing groups through appeals for the
protection of public health or safety, these claims are often
erroneous and fail to produce any concrete evidence of how lack of
licensing will lead to consumer harm. 166 In fact, while licensing
may be beneficial for those that ultimately obtain a license to
practice, the cost comes at the expense of consumers, who face
reduced service opportunity and higher price points. 167 Economists
have found that the effect of licensing on price and quality of
service cost consumers up to nearly $139 billion a year. 168 In
addition, this high price of licensing for consumers have garnered
limited impact on the quality of service received by consumers. 169
In sum, while occupational licensing should theoretically protect
the consumer from a variety of dangers, studies have continuously
concluded that currently occupational licensing may not actually
improve consumer protection as well as once perceived. 170
In recent years, the public has been alerted to the concerns
attached to occupational licensing measures and has called for a
“common-sense changes in the Division of Professional
Licensure” 171 necessary to improve the business climate across the
166. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 31–32 (“State agencies have . . .
been unable to document a need for licensing [certain professions], and such
claims of harm have also failed independent scrutiny.”).
167. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 12 (“Most of the
literature has shown that licensing is beneficial for those fortunate enough or able
to obtain a license, and that these benefits come mainly at the expense of
consumers, who are confronted with reduced availability of services and higher
prices.”).
168. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1098 (citing Morris Kleiner, leading
economist on occupational licensing, regarding the high price of licensing for
consumers).
169. See HAMILTON DISCUSSION PAPER, supra note 22, at 15 (explaining a
variety of studies on a range of licensed occupations that found that these
occupations provided the same or worse value of service for the consumer).
170. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, at 15 (“Collectively, these studies
indicate that occupational licensing as it is commonly practices may not improve
consumer protection.”).
171. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1098 (suggesting that politicians and
the mainstream media have noticed and begun to campaign for the reform on
behalf of the public and their constituents); see also Press Release, Massachusetts
Office of the Governor, Governor Patrick Builds on Regulatory Reform Success;
Files Legislation to Improve Business Climate for Licensed Professionals (Jan. 7,
2013), http://www.maroundtable.com/aroundTable/1301/RegulatoryReform.pdf
[hereinafter Builds Press Release] (proposing a list of changes to the licensing
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states and defend against excessive licensing. 172 The ALLOW Act
provides a targeted solution to the anticompetitive impact of
unjustifiable occupational licensing requirements. 173
III. The ALLOW Act
The Alternatives to Licensing that Lower Obstacles to Work
Act, or the ALLOW Act, seeks to make targeted changes to federal
licensure policy through the reduction for unnecessary licensing
requirements. 174 Senate Bill S.3158 was introduced to the Senate
on July 12, 2016, sponsored by Senators Mike Lee (R-UT) (Lee) and
Ben Sasse (R-NE) (Sasse) and referred to the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. 175 Representatives
Mark Meadows (R-NC) and Dave Brat introduced the bill before
the House of Representatives, H.R. 6312, before the House
Oversight and Government Reform, Armed Services, and Natural
Resources Committee, on November 14, 2016. 176 H.R. 6312 was
referred to the Subcommittee on Military Personnel on December
1, 2016. 177 The bills in both houses are nearly identical, and the
Senate bill will be widely referenced for the purposes of this Note.
The ALLOW Act seeks to make targeted changes to federal
licensure policy by reducing occupational licensing requirements
on federal installments as well as to implement a model to review
and reduce occupational licensing regimes in the District of

structure in Massachusetts to improve the economic health and business climate
of the state) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
172. See Builds Press Release, supra note 171, at 1 (“Governor Patrick today
announced legislation to streamline and improve the licensing process and
business climate for thousands of professional licensees throughout
Massachusetts.”).
173. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (framing the anticompetitive
regime created by licensing boards and outlining the solutions provided by the
act).
174. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 207 (stating that “[a]n individual may
engage in a lawful occupation without being subject to occupational regulations
that are—(1) arbitrary; or (2) unnecessary and substantially burdensome”).
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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Columbia. 178 The bill establishes that the federal government may
establish an individual’s authorization to have their license or
certification honored in employment on a military installation
located on federally-owned land. 179 The bill seeks to:
[P]romote economic opportunity for military families, to
facilitate workforce attachment for military spouses in
their chosen occupation across multiple geographical
postings, to reduce barriers to work on military
installations, to amend the District of Columbia Code to
promote greater freedom in the practice of regulated
occupations, to combat abuse of occupational licensing
laws by economic incumbents, to promote competition,
encourage innovation, protect consumers, and promote
compliance with Federal antitrust law, and for other
purposes. 180
If Congress passes this legislation, the District will hopefully
be the first of many jurisdictions to revoke restrictive occupational
licensing regimes. In addition, the legislation could provide
economic relief for military families across the nation, who face a
heightened risk of falling victim to the expense and restrictions of
entering the same licensed occupations within their state.

178. See Meadows Press Release, supra note 18 (quoting Representative
Meadows, “[I]t’s very clear that many of the rules and requirements go beyond
protecting health and safety standards and instead serve as a barrier to jobs . . . .
[T]his bill can refocus our licensing requirements on only the most pertinent
situations”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice); see also Press Release, Office of Senator Mike Lee, Sens. Lee, Sasse
Introduce Alternatives to Licensing that Lower Obstacles to Work (ALLOW) Act
(July 12, 2016), http://www.lee.senate.gov /public/index.cfm/2016/7/sens-lee-sasse
-introduce-alternatives-to-licensing-that-lower-obstacles-to-work-allow-act
(“Sens. Mike Lee (R-UT) and Ben Sasse (R-NE) introduced legislation . . . that
would make it easier for many Americans to begin(“Sens. Mike Lee (R-UT) and
Ben Sasse (R-NE) introduce legislation . . . that would make it easier for many
Americans to begin work in their chosen field by reducing unnecessary licensing
burdens.”) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
179. ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 101.
180. Id.
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A. Importance of the Act
The ALLOW Act’s primary goal is to reform occupational
licensing in the District of Columbia and on other federal property,
such as national parks and military bases. 181 The bills in both
houses of Congress suggest that requiring the government’s
permission to work through obtainment of a license should be
reserved for occupations that potentially pose true threats to public
health and safety. 182
Most importantly, the ALLOW Act will assist the federal
government in removing “a government-imposed barrier to
opportunity.” 183 In a statement released by cosponsors, Lee and
Sasse, the Senators stress that the legislation would lower the
burden for many Americans by allowing them to begin work in
their chosen fields, without the constraints of licensing regimes. 184
Lee described the underlying motivation for the passage of the act:
The principle at the heart of the American economic
system is equality of opportunity. In practice, this mean
eliminating all forms of legal privilege and political
favoritism, so that the economy rewards hard work,
initiative,
good
judgement,
and
personal
responsibility . . . . Unfortunately, too many localities
have allowed licensing requirements to become a barrier
to prevent younger and less fortunate workers from
getting better and higher-paying jobs. 185
181. See Jared Meyer, New Congress Can Limit Occupational Licensing,
FORBES (Jan. 23, 2017, 4:26 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jaredmeyer/2017/
01/23/new-congress-can-limit-occupational-licensing/#7009587e3cd1 [hereinafter
Meyer] (describing the reasons for the Act and the importance of the shifting
viewpoints regarding occupational licensing) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
182. See id. (interviewing the House Representative Meadows (R-NC)
regarding the changes that the ALLOW Act proposes).
183. See id. (explaining that licensing is supposed to be the last resort of
regulators, reserved only for professions that pose a serious potential harm to
public health and safety).
184. See Press Release, Office of Sen. Mike Lee, Sens. Lee, Sasse Introduce
Alternatives to Licensing that Lower Obstacles to Work (ALLOW) Act (July 12,
2016), http://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/7/sens-lee-sasse-introduc
e-alternatives-to-licensing-that-lower-obstacles-to-work-allow-act (describing the
introduction of ALLOW Act legislation and the primary goals of the Act) (on file
with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
185. See id. (discussing one of the motivating factors in pursuing occupational
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To achieve these means and promote America’s entrepreneurial
spirit, the Act leverages Congress’s Article I authority over federal
enclaves to advance models for licensing reforms. 186 By rethinking
the approach to occupational licensing regulations, Lee expresses
his hope that the Act will help the American economy to grow and
make “room for the full range of human talents, aspirations and
imaginations to flourish” 187 by rethinking occupational licensing
laws and to ensure “that our economy is set up to benefit the hard
work of all Americans.” 188
B. What the ALLOW Act does for the District of Columbia and
Federal Lands
The focus of the ALLOW Act centers around reforming
occupational licensing requirements within the District of
Columbia, 189 with the hopes that it will serve as a legislative
reformative model throughout the states. 190 The Act will expressly
limit the creation of new occupational licensing requirements in
the District of Columbia and federal property, such as national
parks and military bases. 191
The Act seeks to limit creation of occupational licensing
requirements in the District, and other federal property, only to
circumstances where the profession may truly affect public health,

licensing reform measures).
186. See generally id. (describing the ALLOW act as a model to states for
occupational licensing reform).
187. See Senator Mike Lee, Remarks on Occupational Licensing, The ALLOW
Act at The Heritage Foundation (July 12, 2016), https://www.lee.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm/2016/7/remarks-on-occupational-licensing-the-allow-act
(remarking on the importance of the Act to encourage and promote the
entrepreneurial spirit of the American people) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
188. Id.
189. See Meyer, supra note 178 (describing the primary purpose of the
ALLOW Act and the impact it may have on the District of Columbia).
190. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (explaining one of the key goals
of the Act as it is related to reforms in the District of Columbia).
191. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 201 (describing the scope of the Act as
recognizing any state occupational certification as valid on federal lands,
including military installations and the District of Columbia).
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safety, or welfare. 192 In doing so, the Act mandates policy limiting
enforcements of license requirements only to services that meet
standards expressly identified in the statute. 193 The Act also
promotes less restrictive requirements including certification and
regulation practices and establishes a dedicated office within the
District Attorney’s Office to establish active supervision of the
occupational boards. 194
The Act also calls for legislative oversight of licensed
industries. Specifically, the act calls for a “sunrise review” of any
new proposed licensing requirements, calling for a full evaluation
of any of the possible impacts on workers or economic growth, as
well as an analysis of whether the less restrictive regulations could
be applicable. 195 The Act calls for a sunset review as well, applying
similar analytical frameworks to existing occupational licensing
laws in the District. 196 Together, these processes seek to review
existing occupational licensing laws over a five-year period and
implement new proposals for appropriate, less burdensome
alternatives. 197 While only applicable to the District of Columbia,
military bases and federal enclaves, the drafters of the legislature
envision the proposed Act as a model for state reform. 198

192. See Meyer, supra note 178 (quoting Rep. Meadows on the goals of the Act
on federal lands).
193. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 206(b)–(c) (outlining the guideposts of
what may professions may remain licensed and the review process).
194. See id. § 205 (describing the functions of the oversight offices within the
District Attorney’s office).
195. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (describing the sunrise and
sunset reviews of current and proposed occupational licensing professions tasked
to the legislature to consider other less restrictive, regulatory means); see also
ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 206(b)(2)(A) (outlining the factors to consider during
the sunrise review of new proposed licensing requirements).
196. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 206(c)(2) (listing factors to consider
doing the sunset review process).
197. See id. §§ 204–06 (discussing the policies regarding occupational
licensure, the duties of the office of supervision of occupational boards, and time
tables periodic analysis of occupational regulations).
198. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (“The Act: Serves as a model
for reform in the states by limiting the creation of occupational licenses
requirements in the District only to those circumstances in which it is the least
restrictive means of protecting the public health, safety or welfare.”).
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C. Benefits for Military Families

Veterans and military families face especially unique
challenges in the labor market. 199 For the families of military
personnel, frequent moves combined with varying occupational
licensing requirements across state lines make it exceedingly
difficult and expensive. 200 These issues also affect former military
personnel. 201 Veterans often struggle to find jobs in the private
sector, despite their valuable military experience that is oftentimes
relevant and transferrable to high growth civilian jobs. 202 Many
occupational licensing boards refuse to recognize or transfer the
education and experience obtained in service, requiring veterans
to invest in specific educational and training institutions to secure
civilian credentials and licensing. 203 Military families are more
than ten times more likely to have been moved across state lines
in the past year compared to their civilian counterparts, and nearly
thirty-five percent of military spouses in the work force hold
occupations in professions that commonly require licensing or
certification. 204
The ALLOW Act serves essential functions for members of
military families. If enacted, the Act would provide significant
199. See id. (explaining how military spouses are effectively blocked from
pursuing their chosen field of work “[t]hirty-five percent of military spouses in the
labor force work in professions that require a state issued license and they are 10
times more likely to have moved across State lines in the last year”).
200. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MILITARY SKILL FOR AMERICA’S
FUTURE: LEVERAGING MILITARY SERVICE AND EXPERIENCE TO PUT VETERANS AND
MILITARY SPOUSES BACK TO WORK 1 (May 31, 2012), https://obamawhitehouse.
archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/veterans_report_5-31-2012.pdf [hereinafter
EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT] (describing the regular challenges that military
and their families face in obtaining employment) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
201. Id.
202. See id. (discussing the difficulty veterans face when looking to transfer
their credentials to the private sector).
203. See id. (explaining the historical lack of opportunity faced by veterans in
obtaining civilian credentials and licensing requirements).
204. See id. at 8 (noting that 15.2 percent of military spouses moved across
state lines annually, compared to 1.1 percent of civilian spouses and that nearly
35 percent of military spouses in the work force are trained in professions that
commonly require occupational licensing); see also ALLOW Act Summary, supra
note 20 (noting the relatively high percent of military spouses trained in
professions that typically require an occupational license).
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protection for military families, often burdened by inconsistent
licensing requirements or lack of reciprocity for professions across
state lines, as they travel to join their spouses at their respective
stations. 205
The Act seeks to harmonize occupational entry requirements
on military bases by actively endorsing reciprocity between states
and baes to promote workforce attachment for military spouses. 206
In doing so, the ALLOW Act aims to endorse “occupational licenses
and certifications granted by any State, regardless of whether the
military installation is located in the issuing State.” 207 The license
or certification will remain honored so long as the license has not
expired, been revoked, or been suspended by the issuing state and
that there are no outstanding disciplinary or enforcement
proceedings posed against the individual brought by the certifying
authority or licensing board. 208
IV. Is the ALLOW Act Constitutionally Defensible
There is wide spread recognition of the economic harms
associated with overt occupational licensing boards and
professions. 209 The power of occupational licensing regimes has
been recognized by many politicians, and there has been
widespread bipartisan support to address these oppressive
regimes. 210 The ALLOW Act takes an important step in the
direction of occupational licensing reform in this country, reducing
unnecessary regulatory overreach and restrictions to hundreds of
205. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (explaining the burdens faced
by military families in particular).
206. See id. (discussing the endorsement of military bases to accept
occupational licenses from other states).
207. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16, § 101(a) (mandating that military bases
and other federal lands, including the district, honor the valid licenses of other
States).
208. See id. § 101(a)(1)–(2) (outlining reasons when a license from another
State may not be honored).
209. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 22, at 1099 (pointing out the recognition of
the potential harms associated with occupational licensing).
210. See id. at 1098–99 (naming politicians, including Massachusetts
Governor Deval Patrick, Florida Governor Rick Scott, and Former First Lady
Michelle Obama, who have taken stands against excessive licensing on the state
and level and attempted to implement measures to combat the practice).

300

24 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 261 (2017)

professions. As written, the ALLOW Act is Constitutionally
defensible in its authority to implement the act both in
Washington, D.C., on military bases, and on federally owned lands.
Licensing boards and local officials alike are not thrilled about
the prospect of reducing licensing requirements. It is
understandable that licensing boards would be opposed to such
reform, as their ability to control their markets within the states
would be reduced.
The Interior Design Lobby has been particularly vocal in
opposition to reducing any movement towards reducing licensing
requirements. 211 Interior designers near the top of the list of the
most difficult occupation to enter in the three states and the
District of Columbia where practice requires a license. 212 Aspiring
interior designers in these jurisdictions require passage of a
national exam, pay an average of nearly $400 in entrance fees and
devote six years to education and internship requirements before
beginning to work. 213 Multiple state commissions have conducted
studies and produced findings that “there is simply no need to
license interior designers.” 214 The Interior Design Lobby is
notorious for waging a thirty year campaign within state
legislatures, seeking greater regulation and establishment of
licensing boards throughout the states. 215 The basis of the Interior
Design Lobby’s argument depends on an alleged threat to public
health and safety that may result from unlicensed practitioners of
211. See generally The Advancement of Our Profession is in Jeopardy: The
ALLOW Act is a Threat to the Profession of Interior Design and those who Practice
It!, ONE VOICE, p2a.co/huzTYIF (last visited Dec. 1, 2017) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
212. See ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20 (“In the District, for example,
time consuming and often expensive licensing requirements are imposed on
would be entry-level interior designers, tour guides, cosmetologists, florists, and
pest control workers, to name a few—with little or no legitimate public purpose
served.”).
213. See CARPENTER, supra note 23, at 14 (“Aspiring designers must pass a
national exam, pay an average of $364 in fees and devote an average of almost
2,200 days—six years—to a combination of education and apprenticeship before
they can begin work.”).
214. See id. at 25 (“[M]ultiple state commissions have studied the issues and
have concluded that there is simply no need to license interior designers.”).
215. See id. at 29 (describing the lengths to which the Interior Design Lobby
has gone to establish occupational licensing regulatory boards throughout the
states).
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interior design, despite failure of the group to provide any evidence
indicating such a danger. 216 The Interior Design Lobby has reacted
aggressively to the ALLOW Act.
The Interior Design Lobby launched a website campaigning
against the ALLOW Act, calling for citizens to contact their
senators through an email form included on the website itself. 217
The website threatens that the ALLOW Act “puts the practice
rights of any firm or individual doing business in Washington, D.C.
in the cross-hairs of being taken away. More importantly, it
jeopardizes the public’s safety, health, and welfare by calling into
question the necessity of an interior designer on a
construction/renovation project!” 218 The website uses additional
scare tactics and threatens that the Act “could lead to outlawing
the rights of any interior designer to practice, not just those with a
license or those trying to obtain one.” 219 Reviewing the text of the
ALLOW Act itself, it appears that this threat misleads the reader
and is ill-founded. The Act would merely review the licensing
requirements of the profession and review whether the profession
even needs the restrictive regulation, and would likely replace
licensing requirements with less-inhibitive
certification
requirements. 220 These measures would actually allow more
individuals to learn the skillset required to engage in interior
design, as is permitted in much of the country, not endanger
practice of the profession, as the site seems to address. 221
While the Interior Design Lobby has not enjoyed widespread
success in their state campaign encouraging greater regulation for
their profession, in the states that it has had success in
establishing heightened regulations, entrance into the profession
216. See id. at 29–30 (indicating that the Interior Design Lobby has failed to
implement this legislation in all but Florida, Louisiana, Nevada, and the District
of Columbia).
217. See generally The Advancement of Our Profession is in Jeopardy: The
ALLOW Act is a Threat to the Profession of Interior Design and those who Practice
It!, supra note 211.
218. See id. (arguing reasons why the ALLOW Act could plausibly effect the
practice of their profession).
219. See id. (warning interior designers that the ALLOW Act could have these
effects on their practice).
220. See generally ALLOW Act, supra note 16.
221. See CARPENTER ET AL., supra note 23, at 6 (indicating that only three
states and the District of Columbia have implemented licensing measures).
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has become one of the most onerous. 222 ALLOW Act legislators
should take note of the Interior Design Lobby and its focus on
eliminating this bill in the District, but, if the bill passes, the lobby
will likely not pose a large threat to additional state adoption of
similar acts.
Despite the threats from the Interior Design Lobby, a more
valid concern over passage of the ALLOW Act resonates from state
and local officials. Officials have raised concerns that the Act will
“undemocratically alter the District of Columbia’s local laws
concerning occupational licensing.” 223 These proponents argue that
passage of the act would impose on decisions that should be in the
hands local officials with the District, “not by politicians who are
unaccountable to local residents.” 224 These arguments give rise to
concerns over the constitutionality of a locality’s sovereignty over
its own economy.
Courts have recognized that decisions regarding occupational
licensing fall under a state’s police powers. 225 The ALLOW Act
merely serves as a suggestive model for the states to adopt under
their respective of their legislative processes. It does not attempt
to override the states’ ability to regulate occupations as they see
fit.
The ALLOW Act directly affects the District’s governance over
occupational licensing rules. 226 Pursuant to Congress’s Article I
222. See id. at 30 (stating that the interior designer lobby has failed to enjoy
much success, but has imposed the greatest barriers in the jurisdictions it has
established itself in).
223. See Austermuhle, supra note 134 (describing the trepidation and the
concerns local officials have over a quintessentially local decision).
224. See id. (quoting D.C. Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton (D) in a statement
concerning the ALLOW Act effect on the District’s economic governance, arguing
that it is an “imposition” on decisions that should be decided by the District’s local
government).
225. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curium)
(explaining that states have autonomy over the regulation of their local economies
under their police powers); see also City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light
Co., 435 U.S. 389, 438 (concluding that a State is free to allocate its governmental
power to subdivision as it wishes including with regard to regulation of its local
economies, under its police power); see also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 791–93 (establishing that states have a compelling interest to govern
professions that practice under their jurisdiction and therefore have the ability to
set licensing standards and regulate professions).
226. See Austermuhle, supra note 134 (citing Senator Mike Lee in regards to
the ability of the act under the Federal Enclave Clause to establish control over
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authority over federal enclaves, which includes the District of
Columbia, military bases and National Park, the ALLOW Act, if
passed would provide Congress broad Constitutional authority
over occupational licensing in the District and over federally owned
lands. 227
The Federal Enclave Clause grants Congress an extraordinary
amount of power over federal enclaves, including military bases
and the District of Columbia, insulating the state from applying its
own laws to these regions. 228 The federal enclave doctrine states
that, absent congressional consent, a state or local political
subdivision cannot levy a direct tax on property located on federal
land and acquired exclusive jurisdiction from the state. 229 The
federal enclave doctrine states:
Congress shall have the power to exercise exclusive
legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District (not
exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by cession of
particular States and the Acceptance of Congress, become
the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to
exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the
Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same
shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals,
dock-Yards and other needful Buildings. 230
The Enclave Clause empowers Congress to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over federal enclaves. 231

all the jurisdiction the act attempts to control); see also Senator Mike Lee, supra
note 176 (remarking the power that Congress must implement the change under
Congress’s Article I Constitutional powers).
227. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17 (subjecting lands purchased by the
federal government to the exclusive federal jurisdiction and control of congress,
exclusive of the state government).
228. See Emily S. Miller, The Strongest Defense You’ve Never Heard of: The
Constitution’s Federal Enclave Doctrine and its Effect on Litigants, States, and
Congress, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 73, 74 (2011) (describing the power of the
Federal Enclave Clause).
229. See generally George H. Pretty, II & P. Scott Manning, The Federal
Enclave Doctrine—Property Tax Exclusion based on Constitutional Principles, 24
J. MULTISTATE TAX’N 26 (Sept. 2014) (articulating the purpose of the federal
enclave doctrine).
230. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
231. Id.
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The Federal Enclave Clause is perhaps best known for
establishing the District of Columbia. 232 The Federal Enclave
Clause awards Congress the power to “exercise exclusive
Legislation in all Cases whatsoever over the District of
Columbia.” 233 The use of the phrase “in all Cases whatsoever”
emphasizes the unquestionable administrative authority that
Congress exercises over the District and its internal conditions and
operations. 234 Considering the extent of the clause, it seems
undeniable that Congress has Constitutional control over the
District’s occupational licensing boards, if the ALLOW Act is
enacted.
The Representative status of the District of Columbia within
Congress remains one of Congress’s oldest controversies, 235 and is
a concern at issue with local governments in regards to the
ALLOW Act. 236 The nonvoting status of the District within the
United States’ representative system “is fundamentally at odds
with the principles and traditions of our constitutional system” 237
as the right to vote is one of the most basic and precious rights as
citizens in a free country. 238 Despite the Constitutional ambiguity
concerning the issue of whether the District should have voting
authority and representation within Congress, this issue has yet
232. See Miller, supra note 228, at 75 (discussing the genesis and most notable
quality of the Federal Enclave Act).
233. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 263 (asserting that Congress
has the power to enact and control legislation in the District of Columbia).
234. See Jonathan Turley, Too Clever by Half: The Unconstitutionality of
Partial Representation of the District of Columbia in Congress, 76 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 305, 319 (emphasizing the administrative and operation character of the
power given to Congress in the Federal Enclave Clause and establishing that
Congress does appear to have Constitutional ability to exercise its power over the
District).
235. See id. at 305 (“When the Democratic majority took control of the 110th
Congress, one of the first matters on the agenda was one of its the oldest
controversies: the representational status of the District of Columbia in
Congress.”).
236. See Austermehle, supra note 134 (conveying the concerns of District
officials, voicing their wishes to be autonomous over the economies of the District).
237. See Turley, supra note 234, at 306 (stressing the constitutional
ambiguity posed by the Federal Enclave Clause).
238. See Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (“No right is more
precious in a free country than that of having a voice in the election of those who
make the laws under which, as good citizens we must live. Other rights, even the
most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.”).
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to be resolved. Congress has yet to grant the District of Columbia
representation within Congress, and the ALLOW Act could
potentially be applied with ease in the District.
Beyond establishing the Federal government’s jurisdiction
over the District of Columbia, the Federal Enclave Clause also
upholds implementation of the Act in the additional targeted
jurisdictions. 239 Regarding Congress’s ability to exercise its
jurisdiction over military bases and other Federal Lands, there is
little doubt that the Federal Enclave Clause allows Congress to
apply this Act to these areas. The Federal Enclave Clause grants
Congress an extremely powerful jurisdiction over entities,
including military bases, national parks, post offices, and federal
courthouses. 240 When the United States purchases property from
a state for purposes set forth in this article of the Constitution with
the consent of the state legislature, the property is controlled by
federal jurisdiction, “exclusive of state authority.” 241
After a state transfers authority over a tract of land to the
federal government, a federal government, “the state may no
longer impose new state laws on these lands.” 242 The federal
enclave doctrine also preempts any existing state law contrary to
the mandate or act of Congress. 243 Under the Federal Enclave
239. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
240. See Miller, supra note 228, at 73 (introducing the potential of the federal
enclave doctrine to create a powerful defense for entities operating on what is
technically federal land).
241. Pretty & Manning, supra note 229, at 28 (discussing the process when
the federal government purchases state land). George H. Pretty, II and P. Scott
Manning write:
Courts have interpreted the phrase “other needful buildings” broadly
to include whatever structures are found to be necessary in performing
the function of the federal government. When the United States
purchases property from a state for purposes set forth in Article I,
Section 8, Clause 17 of the Constitution and the state legislature
consents, the property is generally subject to federal jurisdiction
exclusive of state authority. Land over which the United States
government exercises federal legislative jurisdiction is a “federal
enclave.”
Id.
242. See Allison v. Boeing Laser Technical Services, 689 F.3d 1234, 1235 (10th
Cir. 2012) (concluding that federal government has jurisdiction over federal
enclaves).
243. See Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245, 268 (1963) (“Since a State may
not legislate with respect to a federal enclave unless it reserved the right to do so
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Clause, Congress undoubtedly can implement this Act on military
bases and National Parks, as it proposes.
Finally, apart from Congress’s ability to apply this Act
constitutionally to military bases under the Federal Enclave
Clause, Congress also secures constitutional authority under the
Militia Clauses of the Constitution (Militia Clauses). 244 The
ALLOW Act directly applies reciprocity to certain professions that
require an occupational license. 245 The Militia Clauses grant
Congress the authority “to raise and support Armies” 246 and
provide for the military organization, arming and discipline by any
means necessary. 247 The court have held that regarding the Militia
Clauses, the Constitution grants Congress unlimited power to
provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia. 248
Courts have given Congress broad discretion in determining what
constitutes as an action necessary to provide for the nation’s
military, as the issues typically invoke questions of policy. 249 The

when it gave its consent to the purchase by the United States, only state law
existing at the time of the acquisition remains enforceable, not subsequent laws.”)
(citations omitted); see also Brookhaven Sci. Assocs. v. Donaldson, No. 04-4013
(LAP), 2007 WL 2319141, at *1, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2007) (stating that any claim
brought by the state on a federal enclave is preempted by the Constitution).
244. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12; U.S. Const. art 1, § 8, cl. 16.
245. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16.
246. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12.
247. Id. § 8, cl. 16.
248. Accord Donn v. A.W. Chesterton Co., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 803, 813–14
(E.D. Pa. 2012) (finding that procurement of goods and materials for military
operations fall within the federal government’s exercise of war powers because
their role was to supply Naval vessels, therefore protecting their actions, despite
the fact that they were not involved in military operations during wartime); see
Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 349 (2009) (concluding that,
pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, Congress may provide for the common defense,
raise and support armies, make rules for Armed Forces operations, and enact
necessary and proper laws, for such purposes, granting additional powers to
Congress); see also Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. 1, 9 (1820) (finding that Congress
has unlimited power to provide for the organization, arming, and discipline of the
militia).
249. See Donn, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (finding that the issue in the case
implicated policy issues and therefore gave rise to the political question doctrine,
which excludes controversies which revolve around policy choices and value
determinations reserved for Congress (citing Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am.
Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986))).
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political question doctrine preempts courts from judicial review of
controversies that involve policy choices. 250
In upholding the constitutionality of the ALLOW Act’s section
regarding acceptance of occupational license from other states, one
could argue that providing opportunity for military spouses to
secure employment falls under the purview of the Militia Clauses
and is protected under the political question doctrine. Congress
has the authority to raise and support the armies and to provide
for the general military organization as necessary. 251 The courts
have found that this applies to issues not only involved in military
operations during wartime, but also in Congress’s capacity to
support military acts. 252 The ability to keep military families
together and ensure employment for spouses after transferring to
various military posts across state lines to support the service
member in their family could arguably serve as a verifiable
Congressional act to “support” the military. Applying this logic, the
ALLOW Act would allow the spouse to overcome licensing
requirements on the military base, preempting state preference to
deny a military spouse employment on these grounds. In addition,
the policies the ALLOW Act pursues regarding encouragement of
family autonomy with this reciprocity would fall under the
Political Question Doctrine, preempting judicial review of any
challenge to applying the policy on military installments. 253 The
ALLOW Act would likely pass constitutional muster under the
Constitution’s Militia Clauses and the Political Question Doctrine.
A. Can the ALLOW Act Go Further?
Occupational licensing regimes have undoubtedly created
incredible burdens on individuals seeking employment across the
250. See id. at 818 (discussing the types of claims the political question
doctrine precludes from judicial review, including requiring courts to evaluate the
wisdom of military policy).
251. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 12; U.S. CONST. art 1, § 8, cl. 16.
252. See Donn, 842 F. Supp. 2d at 814 (concluding that actions that supported
the military, even during non-wartimes, fell under the purview of Congressional
oversight under the militia clause).
253. See id. at 815 (determining that a political question is found when the
issue is inherently political in nature or would cause the court to make a policy
determination on behalf of Congress).
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states. Reform is necessary to address, evaluate, and remedy these
issues, especially for the majority of professions that impact lowto moderate-income workers, as their professions typically do not
pose possible repercussions to the general public’s health and
safety. 254 In addition, the commitment of the previous
administration in improving the ability of former military
personnel and their families as well as the focus seem to, at least,
seem to call for occupational licensing reciprocity beyond military
bases. 255 The ALLOW Act likely could not be expanded to
encompass and address these concerns entirely.
Pursuant to the United States Constitution’s Tenth
Amendment, any power “not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by the States, are reserved to the
States respectively.” 256 Accordingly, occupational licensing falls
under the purview of the state’s right to control its local economies
and is found amongst the state’s police powers. 257 Further, in
balancing between an individual’s interest in the right to choose
their own profession, courts have often sided with the states’
licensing boards, granting deference to licensing, that has
traditionally been considered a function of the state.
While courts have begun to notice and take action on
restrictive and absurd occupational licensing requirements, 258 the
254. See Kleiner, supra note 39, at 189 (agreeing that some occupations do
require a higher level of oversight, especially when failure to properly train
individuals can create hazardous circumstances that could be deadly or
dangerous, but that the majority of professions subject to licensing do not fall
within this category).
255. See generally EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 200 (asserting
the importance of providing professional opportunity for former military
personnel as well as active duty military families).
256. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
257. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam)
(establishing that states are able to regulate their own economies under their
police powers); see also License Cases, 46 U.S. 504, 583 (1847) (describing the
extent of what police powers cover within the state, including the power to govern
all things “within the limits of its dominion”); see also Klein, supra note 23, at 415
(stating that occupational licensing is controlled at the state level and falls within
a state’s police powers).
258. See Patel v. Texas Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469 S.W.3d 69, 90
(Tex. 2015) (ruling that irrelevant tasks labeled as training hours, egregious
training expense, and various other practices proved that the licensing
requirements were unreasonable, harsh, and violated the state’s Constitution,
interfering with citizen applicant’s enjoyment of their life and liberty).
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clearest and most expeditious way for occupational licensing
reform falls to state legislatures. By adopting the suggested
reforms outlined in the proposed ALLOW Act, states can begin
what is sure to be a slow process of reforming occupational
licensing boards and its requirements.
V. Conclusion
As it stands today, the ALLOW Act is Constitutionally
defensible. Occupational Licensing has imposed a restrictive
regime on both the consumer and the worker, created arbitrary
barriers designed to increase the power of the licensing board and
restrict competition. While necessary and useful in some
professions, in the clear majority of licensed occupations, the need
for legislative review is essential to determine less restrictive and
workable means for individuals to obtain the right to work. The
ALLOW Act provides a valuable legislative model for reviewing
these regulatory regimes. Further, the ALLOW Act provides relief
for military families, 259 who often feel the effects of occupational
regulation most harshly, as they are more often subject to
undergoing additional and duplicate training, education and lofty
fees to obtain licensing for a profession they are already licensed
in elsewhere. 260 While there are limits to expanding the legislation
on the federal level, it is imperative that state officials passionate
about protection the economic rights of their citizens look to the
model legislation laid out in the ALLOW Act. Though progress may
begin slowly, considering the backlash surely to come from existing
professional boards upon dismantling these regimes, state
legislators should remain diligent. By drafting their own
legislation, states can truly promote their citizens’ right to work.

259. See ALLOW Act, supra note 16 (stating one purpose of the act is “To
promote economic opportunity for military families”).
260. See generally ALLOW Act Summary, supra note 20.

